We test the relationship between the size of regional trade agreements (RTA) and openness using a gravity equation with multilateral trade factors on a large sample of 143 countries over period 1980-2003. Our sample includes eleven RTAs, seven with constant membership and four with an expanding membership. In the first group, there are more stumbling blocs than building blocs to freer global trade. In the second group, the opposite holds. We also find that regional trade bias declines with the size of the club and that three of the four expanding RTAs have already surpassed their 'optimal' size.
Introduction
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been a prominent feature of the world economy since the creation of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s. Two aspects of this feature are worth noting. The first is the rapid growth and complexities of these arrangements (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005) , although quite a few of them are bilateral agreements of small consequence for international trade (Pomfret 2006, p. 42 ). The second is that several plurilateral with the addition of Venezuela to the original four members; it has five associate members and one observer.
The RTA phenomenon has sparked a growing literature on the role of RTAs in the international trade system; see review article by Panagariya (2000) . Our paper intends to address empirically the relationship between RTA size and trade bias, and is motivated by an old question and a new question. The old question is whether RTAs are "building" or "stumbling" blocs, where "building" means that RTAs expand world trade and "stumbling" the opposite.
1 A pure building bloc occurs when RTA members trade with one another in excess of the trade 1 The terminology of building and stumbling blocs was first introduced by Bhagwati (1991) . For relevant literature on this topic, see Section 7 in Panagariya (2000) .
flows implied by a reference model and without any reduction of trade flows between members and non-members, again beyond the trade flows implied by a reference model. This corresponds to the case of trade creation (TC) without trade diversion (TD) in Viner's (1950) classic study of customs unions. If TD occurs, the RTA expands world trade only if TC exceeds TD; we may call it a weak building bloc. If TD fully offsets TC, the RTA fully reallocates trade from outsiders to insiders; we may call it a weak stumbling bloc. If TD more than fully offsets TC, the RTA is a pure stumbling bloc.
The new question deals with RTA expansion. Larger internal markets resulting from expanding RTAs may make it easier to implement beyond-the-border liberalization programs, as the EU did it in the 1980s with its internal market initiative. Trade creation rises, but trade diversion may rise as well. Since larger RTAs tend to have a higher ratio of internal trade to GDP than smaller RTAs, the pressure to liberalize trade with non-members may decline. Not surprisingly, the EU and the United States protect sensitive sectors like agriculture and textiles where developing countries have a comparative advantage. 2 In the end, whether an expanding RTA tends to be more of a building than a stumbling bloc is an empirical issue.
Our research strategy is as follows. We first estimate the size of the regional trade bias but also the barriers imposed by all other countries on a given country pair. Older GEs that ignore multilateral trade factors are fraught with an omitted variable problem and do not yield consistent and efficient estimates of TC and TD; consequently, the empirical findings based on these older GEs have to be taken with a grain of salt (Carrère 2006 ). We will also estimate TC and TD effects for the different sizes of four RTAs that have enlarged over the sample period.
These estimates allow us to infer whether size increases have gone more in the direction of enhancing than erecting obstacles to world trade growth.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between the size of RTAs, trade creation and trade diversion. In
Section 3 we present the gravity equation with multilateral trade factors and the main econometric issues underlying the testing of this equation. The empirical findings are presented and discussed in Section 4. We end with conclusions.
Size of RTAs, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
In this section we review the essential theoretical literature that bear on our topic of the relationship between RTA size and global trade, as well as some of the empirical literature on the TC and TD effects due to RTAs. Krugman (1991) examines the trade effects of an expansion in the size of trading blocs.
His point of departure is an exogenous number of RTAs of equal size, which set tariffs non-
cooperatively. An increase in the size of the blocs produces a classic combination of TC and TD.
The enlarging RTAs divert trade partly because some of the trade between blocs occurs now within the blocs and partly because these charge a higher external tariff. Welfare level is described by a U-shaped function in the number of RTAs. A single RTA in the world does best because it promotes global free trade; many RTAs do well because they have small power and levy low tariffs; and an intermediate number of RTAs produces the worst outcome. TD need not occur if instead tariffs are set cooperatively. Bond and Syropoulos (1996) countries for the period 1980-1996, separating import from export TD effects. Unlike Frankel et al. (1996) , they do not find statistically significant regional trade biases, but uncover import and export TD for the EU and EFTA. Latin American RTAs, on the other hand, expanded total imports. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) detect TD effects in the EU: the annual growth of trade between member countries and industrial non-member countries fell by 1.7 percentage points over 1956 -1973 . Crawford and Laird (2001 analyze trade data from six RTAs and find that for the period 1990-1999 the average annual growth of imports from non-members is slightly smaller than the average annual growth of insiders' imports.
It is worth repeating that empirical work based on old GEs -those that ignore multilateral trade factors-may be unreliable. Carrère (2006) , after correcting for possible econometric misspecifications of the GE (which will be discussed in the next section), finds that her sample of seven RTAs generates a mixture of TC and TD effects. In particular, regional trade biases, over the period 1962 to 1996, were increasing through the expansion phases of the EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA, accompanied often by a decline of imports from and exports to outsiders.
The Gravity Equation and Econometric Issues
It is now accepted that bilateral trade flows are best explained by the GE; see, among others, Bergstrand (1985, p. 474) , Leamer and Levinsohn (1995 , p. 1384 ), and Deardorff (1998 , and Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose. (2001, p. 431) . The GE has been derived from different models of international trade, ranging from models of complete specialization and identical consumers' preferences (Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Deardorff 1998 ) to models of product differentiation in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman 1987) to hybrid models of different factor proportions and product differentiation (Bergstrand 1989 ) to models of incomplete specialization and trading costs (Haveman and Hummels 2004) . For this paper, we rely on the formulation by AvW.
In the AvW setting, countries enjoy complete specialization and consumers have homothetic preferences. Country i produces good i at price p i . In country j, the good is sold at price p ij = p i ( 1 + t ij ), where t ij imbeds a host of trade costs including transport and transaction costs, regime costs arising from differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, and monetary regimes, and tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions aimed at discriminating against foreign producers. These costs are, for the most part, non-observable and are proxied by physical distance, cultural distance and institutional distance. Thus, countries that are geographically distant face a higher t ij than contiguous pairs; countries that speak the same language and have common roots also face a lower t ij than pairs with heterogeneous cultural background; countries that share the same currency and the same central bank face a lower t ij than nations with different currencies and central banks; and finally countries that belong to the same RTA face lower t ij than countries that do not. Bilateral trade flows are determined as follows (see AvW, eq. 9):
(1)
x ij = y i y j /y w (t ij /P i P j )
1-σ , where x ij = exports from country i to country j, y = income, the subscript w = world, σ = the elasticity of substitution coefficient, P = the consumer price level. P i and P j stand for the multilateral trade costs in the AvW model and are a function of all t ij pairs, countries' income shares and countries' price levels. For σ > 1, bilateral trade flows rise (fall) if multilateral trade costs rise (fall) relative to bilateral trade costs. P i and P j are jointly determined and their omission creates a bias in the estimated coefficients.
The testable equation of (1) is:
( 2) ln(x ijt ) = α 0 + α 1 ln(y i y j ) t + α 2 ln(I i I j ) t + α 3 ln(d ij ) + α 4 CC ijt + α 5 ln P i + α 6 ln P j + β 1 Same-RTA ijt + β 2 Im-RTA ijt + β 3 Ex-RTA ijt + α t + u ijt .
The new terms are as follows. I is per capita income; d is distance; CC is a vector of dummy variables that capture various types of cost reducing affinity shared by the pair of countriessuch as common border, common language, common colonizer, common relationship and common currency-; the three RTA variables capture TC and TD effects generated by the RTA and are discussed fully below; α t is a time effect common to all country pairs; and u ijt = μ ij + ε ijt , where μ ij is either a fixed or random unobserved bilateral effect and ε ijt is the residual error term. It should be noted that (2) descends directly from (1). The per capita income emerges from
(1) through the countries' income shares that influence the two price levels; these income shares are proxied by population.
TC and TD effects and RTA size
In the GE literature, TC and TD effects generated by RTAs have been typically modeled by two dummy variables: Same-RTA, which is equal to one when both countries in the pair belong to the same RTA and zero otherwise, and Im-RTA, which is equal to one when the import country belongs to the RTA and the export country does not and zero otherwise; for more details, see Soloaga and Winters (2001) . Pure TC is implied by β 1 >0 and β 2 = 0. An expanding RTA that has those empirical characteristics can be said to have moved in the direction of an optimal size and to have raised welfare. If β 2 is negative, TD emerges and the case for RTA depends on the relative numerical size of the positive β 1 and negative β 2 . An expanding RTA moves weakly in the "good" direction, towards an optimal size, if the positive β 1 is numerical larger than the negative β 2 . Pure TD occurs when β 2 is equal to β 1 ; the expanding RTA, in this case, has moved in the "wrong" direction. Soloaga and Winters (2001) point out that this two-dummy approach ignores the effect of the RTA on non-members' exports and the possibility that RTA members can gain at the expense of non-members. These authors propose third dummy, Ex-RTA, which is equal to one when the export country belongs to the RTA and the import country does not, and zero otherwise. With a three-dummy approach, the assessment of whether an expanding RTA is moving in the right or wrong direction depends not only on the relative numerical size of β 1 and β 2 but also of β 1 and β 3 . Carrère (2006) adopts the Soloaga-Winters three-dummy approach.
The biggest challenge in estimating (2) is to make sure that one captures the multilateral trade factors; otherwise, the error term of the regression will imbed the effects of the variables that determine the two sets of prices and will create a bias in the other coefficients of the regression. AvW (pp. 179-180) solve the problem by estimating with nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations for cross-section data. van Wincoop (2001) and Feenstra (2003) propose the use of country fixed effects, but this alternative is only applicable to cross-section data. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss pitfalls of panel estimation in the presence of multilateral trade factors. These authors dismiss the use of country fixed effects because they fail to take into account that P i and P j vary over time. They recommend instead country-pair fixed effects, as well as separate time fixed effects, to capture all pairwise idiosyncratic characteristics. Carrère (p. 231) accepts that country-pair fixed effects yield unbiased estimates of time-varying variables, but this model has the drawback of eliminating time-invariant variables. The alternative of estimating country-pair effects as random variables has greater economic appeal.
We will estimate equation (2) under the two alternatives of fixed and random countrypair effects, in addition to fixed year effects. We will compare the two models and test the null hypothesis that the fixed effects model is not better than the random effects model. If the null cannot be rejected, we will then use the random model to infer TC and TD effects of RTAs.
Data
We briefly discuss our data here and invite the interested reader to check the Indiana University CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm) and Appendix 1 for more details.
Our data set consists of 215,500 annual observations covering 143 countries over the The mean value of bilateral imports is 341 million US dollars, with a range spanning from one thousand to 201 billion dollars. The mean value of GDP is 286 billion dollars, with a range spanning from 21 million to 11 trillion dollars. The mean value of per capita GDP for importing countries is 6,000 dollars, with a range spanning from 83,000 to 48,000 dollars. The average value of distance is 4,589 miles, with a range spanning from 55 to 12,351 miles.
Country-pair observations with a common land border represent 2.7 per cent of the sample; those with a shared language 21.4 per cent; those with a common colonizer 8 per cent; those with a shared colonial relationship 2.3 per cent; those with a common currency 0.9 per cent; and those belonging to the same RTA 2.6 per cent. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the three RTA dummy variables for the 11 separate agreements. Sample averages for these dummies tend to be relatively low for ASEAN7 (read ASEAN with 7 members), CARCOM 11, NAFTA2, and EU9, and relatively high for SPARTECA, EU12 and E15, with the averages reflecting the size and time length of RTA.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Empirical Findings
Estimates of (2), with both fixed and random country-pair effects and fixed year effects, are reported in Table 2 . The R squares are high by the standards of the GE equations estimated in the literature but are comparable to those reported by Carrère (2006, Hausman (1978) test that the fixed effects model is not better than the random effects model. Therefore, we will concentrate on the random effects model for the remainder of our discussion.
The estimated αs of the random effects model of equation (2) appear to be in line with those reported in the literature. The per capita income variable has the predicted sign, in contrast to the fixed model. The size of the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to income is less than one; the elasticity with respect to distance is numerically larger than one and confirms to be a powerful force in the gravity equation; geographical proximity and cultural affinity variables enhance trade. Countries that share a common currency do not trade any more than those that have different currencies (the coefficient of common currency is not different from zero at the 10 per cent significance level). This result may be surprising given that Rose (2000) has reported that countries with a common currency trade three times as much as countries with different currencies (and fluctuating exchange rates). However, Rose's (2000) finding has been met with skepticism from the start; see the comments to Rose by Persson (2001) . From the viewpoint of this paper, the serious problem with Rose's GE equation is the omission of multilateral trade factors. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) focus on Rose's finding to demonstrate the distortion that such an omission can create. To check on this point, when we estimated (2) with fixed importing-country (instead of fixed country-pair effects) and year effects, the coefficient of common currency turned out to be 0.62 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
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[Insert Table 2 here]
Non-expanding RTAs
Having disposed of the general characteristics of the estimated GE, we can now concentrate on the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade flows. We recall that our sample includes 11 RTAs, of which four have expanded at least once since 1980. We consider first the non-expanding RTAs.
SPARTECA is the pristine example of a pure building bloc towards global free trade, with a strong regional trade bias accompanied by expansion of imports and exports to the rest of the world. ANDEAN as well is a building bloc, although weaker than SPARTECA: it has a sizeable regional trade bias and a small import TD. 4 USIS has a positive regional trade bias but also a fully offsetting import TD; there is also some evidence of export TD. 5 Therefore, USIS is a pure TD case and an obstacle to global free trade. The remaining four non-expanding RTAs -ANZCERTA, CACM, MERCOSUR, and PATCRA--show evidence of TD, either on the import or the export side, and no evidence of positive regional trade bias; they too must be classified as stumbling blocs. In sum, of the seven non-expanding RTAs covered by our sample, only two have behaved as building blocs.
Expanding RTAs
Of the remaining four RTAs, ASEAN, CARICOM and the EU have expanded three times during our sample period and NAFTA only once. ASEAN is the perfect example of an expanding building bloc. In each successive enlargements, a strong and statistically very significant positive regional trade bias has been matched by an equally strong expansion of imports and exports to the rest of the world. Judged exclusively in terms of the size of the regional trade bias, ASEAN seems to have peaked with a membership of nine; see Table 3 .
4 The export TD effect is not statistically significant at the 10 per cent. 5 The export TD effect is significant at the 10 per cent.
The EU can also be considered a building bloc, although weaker than ASEAN. EU9 has a marginally significant positive regional trade bias and expanding imports and exports to the rest of the world. EU10 is not statistically different than EU9. With both EU12 and EU15, the regional trade bias remains positive but declines relative to EU9 (see Table 3 ); import expansion disappears with EU12 and becomes outright TD in EU15; export expansion, although positive, declines progressively in the two enlargement phases. The data seem to suggest that the EU peaked with a membership of ten. One way to interpret this result is that the two enlargements, NAFTA can also be judged a building bloc, comparable to the EU but weaker than ASEAN. NAFTA2 created no regional trade bias but expanded imports from the rest of the world. NAFTA3 has a strong positive regional trade bias and import expansion but diverts exports from the rest of the world. Overall, TC exceeds TD and this RTA makes a contribution to global free trade (see Table 3 ).
CARICOM is a classic case of an expanding RTA with a positive regional trade bias achieved at the expense of trade with the outside world. Positive internal biases are present in CARICOM11, CARICOM12, and CARICOM13; they disappear in CARICOM14. Export TD appears consistently through all the expansion phases, whereas import expansion is marginally significant in three out of the four bloc sizes. Clearly, CARICOM14 is a stumbling bloc and a worse outcome for global free trade than when it was smaller (Table 3) .
In sum, the four expanding RTAs have done better for global free trade than the seven static RTAs. ASEAN is the champion of building blocs; the EU and NAFTA have, on balance, contributed to the expansion of world trade; and CARICOM, in its present size, is a stumbling bloc. For ASEAN, the EU, and CARICOM regional trade bias has declined with size (see Table   3 ).
[Insert Table 3 here]
Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that RTAs have produced a mixed record with respect to the important issue of whether they enhance or hamper freer trade in the world. Of the eleven RTAs NAFTA has produced large regional trade bias but in part at the expense of diverting exports against the outside world. CARICOM, of the four expanding RTAs, has the weakest record as a building bloc. The current size of CARICOM is clearly a stumbling bloc.
The evidence presented in the paper has some bearing on the optimal size of the RTA. Our study has focused solely on the relationship between RTA size and trade expansion.
To the extent that countries form new RTAs or join existing ones for other reasons -such as security or political issues---we would not expect a predictable relationship between size and openness. Indeed, political economy considerations complicate matters. For example, Krishna (1998) suggests that import trade-diverting RTAs may be more politically acceptable than tradecreating RTAs because the former do not hurt domestic industry, whereas the latter do by replacing domestic production with production located in the members' countries. 
